2017-03-09 14:31

在其他地方,特别是在一些后共产主义国家,前威权精英的成员可以在新的民主制度中茁壮成长。一些观察人士批评为缺乏这些国家改变的迹象更为现实的观点是,精英的持续影响体现他们是如何进化的共产主义的崩溃之前,建议在新政权的作用,他们都在各自国家的发展提供。例如,Alexander Kwasniewski,在波兰的一个初级部长最后的共产主义政府继续在1995当选总统,部分原因是极点看到他作为“新、前瞻、务实的一代领导人”(P36钻石和普拉特纳2002)。显然这不是在所有情况下的后共产主义政权。波兰在东德和Rakowski独裁政权如Honecker最明显和最声名狼藉的领导人下台迅速而公开的。然而,从共产主义政权的精英,特别是在经济和行政领域的精英一般幸存下来的政权变化相当好。达成共识而不是反对改革似乎是一项对各方都行之有效的政策。Higley和Pakulski的评论:“如果Kullberg一问为什么与共产主义相关的精英们不去对抗民主和资本主义势力的入侵,大部分的回答是,他们不需要;他们的生存的可能性更大,如果他们不打”(P37钻石和普拉特纳2002)。很明显,在精英连续性的程度和它的好处或缺乏他们到一个新政权。虽然适度的连续性可能有助于过渡到一个成功的民主制度,高层次的连续性和明显的共识,前精英可以是破坏性的。作为Higley Kullberg和帕库斯基建议:“在欧洲中部的南部国家和整个苏联的大片,很高程度的精英的连续性已经是后共产主义政权的威权主义隐藏物质表面背后的民主形式”(金刚石和普拉特纳2002)。换言之,一旦达到一个特别高的门槛,精英连续性与民主进步的关系就成反比。


Elsewhere, particularly in some post-communist states, members of former authoritarian elites can thrive in new democratic regimes. Some observers criticise this as an indication of a lack of change in these countries but a more realistic view is that the continued influence of elites reflects how they were evolving before the collapse of communism and suggests that by playing a consensual role in new regimes, they have something to offer in the development of their respective countries. . For example, Alexander Kwasniewski, a junior minister in Poland’s last communist government went on to be elected president in 1995, in part because Poles saw him as part of the “new, forward looking and pragmatic generation of leaders” (p36 Diamond and Plattner 2002). Obvioulsy this is not the case in all post-Communist regimes. The most visible and discredited leaders of authoritarian regimes such as Honecker in the GDR and Rakowski in Poland were removed from power quickly and publicly. Overall however, the elites from communist regimes, particularly in economic and administrative areas have generally survived regime change rather well. Consensus with rather than opposition to reform seems to have been a policy that has worked well for all parties. Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski comment: “if one asks why the elites associated with communist rule did not go down fighting against the inroads of democratic and capitalist forces , much of the answer is that they had little need to; their survival was more likely if they did not fight”(p37 Diamond and Plattner 2002). There is obviously a balance to be struck in the degree of elite continuity and its benefits or lack of them to a new regime. Whilst a moderate amount of continuity might help the transition to a successful democratic regime, high levels of continuity and apparent consensus of former elites can be damaging. As Higley, Kullberg and Pakulski suggest: “in the Southern countries of Central Europe and across the vast sweep of the Soviet Union, very high degrees of elite continuity have gone hand-in-hand with post-communist regimes that hide the substance of authoritarianism behind a veneer of democratic form” (Diamond and Plattner 2002). In other words, once a particularly high level of threshold is reached, the relationship between elite continuity and democratic progress becomes inverse.